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Book Review
"?eueet411te1etat P.i,ei,,a�

D

JOHN R. CAVANAGH, B.S., M.D., F.A.C.P., K.S.G. AND
JAMES B. McGoLDRICK, S.J., M.A., S.T.D., Ph.D.
Review by William J. Devlin, S.J., A.B., M.A., Ph.L.,
M.S.S. W., Ph.D., M.D.

R. CAVA NAG�, a practicing psychi
a t rist, and Fa ther McG
.
oldric ,
� Jesuit
pn��t an� _Psychologist, have coa uthored this te t
_ ecause of _a �efimte and pres
sing need for an org anize. :f
presentat10� of psychiatric stud
ies 'which is duly ba sed on the full
a r. I
ad�qua �e p'.cture of human na
tu re." Their "point of view establ
ish;
l
; n mam t�med throughout this te
xt is not the materialistic deification
(
;:
h
it is not the N�o-platonic scorning
of all m atter ; it is ra tht ,;
th: :::je course esta blished
long ago by th e Aristotelico-Th
.
· omisti -·
.
fus1o
n of m a tte� an d
spm
· ·t m
m a n into one complete, bewilder
inc.
.
comp1 ex, d yna m1c reality
, the human pers on."
The book is divided into seven parts;
a n introductory chapte
.
r deta il;
the extent of ment�I disorders, desc
r ibe s a nd a ttempts a
defi
nitio
n 0;:
th.e tormal personality. Part ( 2)
considers the psychogenic nature
an J
et10_ogy of _ps ychiat ric disorders
. Am ong the latter are intellec
tu
1
�bits ' et�t1o�al f�ctors, volition
, heredity, occ asions and conditio
.
n
f·
_ so me u ed m this chapter is the
a uthors' concept of m
argm
. aI con sciou:_nes�, a s a su bs
titute for th e repressed unconsciou
s of Freud Th(·
�syc ia3tr1c his tory a nd mental
e xa mina tion ma k e up
the eleme�ts or
ar t ( ) · The re foll
ows on·e chapter on the psych
.
one
.
uroses and the
genera l prmc1ples of their trea
tment·' another on the psycho
.
ses b ot,
I
funct·i�naJ a nd or g amc; and a fin
al one on the bor derl
ands of psychiatr y.
wherem the psychopathic
· personaJ·ity, epile
· psy, mental deficien
d·
t�rban ces_ of se x and h_omosexua
lity a re considered. Part ( 7) th
e ��nc/�: s10n, depicts the rel
.
a tionship be tween psy
chiatry, ph·J
I osophy and rehgion. A tweIve pag e g Iossary co
n
tain
ing explanations of 250 psych . .
.
Ia tr 1c
terms is
appende d to the tex
t. The book is well written an
d a dequatel y
edited.
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In g eneral, Fundamental Psychiatry has not achieved its basic
purpose of an organized presentation of psychiatric studies based on the
full and adequate picture of huma n nature as established by the A risto
telico-Thomistic fusion of matter and spirit in man into one complete ,
bewildering, complex, dyna mic reality, th e hum an pe rson. Man is a
unity, a n unum per se, composed of matter and spirit, but primarily a
unity, in essenc e, in natu re, and in action. Psychiatry's fundament al
interest is to understand and comprehend first m a n's unity in essence,
nature and a ction, and secondly, the inter action of the var ious activate d
potentialities within that totality and unity. It is o nly by first under
standing the unity of man in esse nce , na tu re and action that psychia t r y
will begin to compreh end this complete , comple x, bewildering, dynamic
reality known - as m an. But this unity of man can never be per ceived
clearly or fundamentally from th e viewpoint of m an's efficient causality
but only from the viewpoint of his fin al c ausality or teleological orienta
tion. The "dynamic" part of man ultimately lies not in an efficient force
but rather in a purposeful direction. This is the basic reason for the
present popularity of psychoanalysis . It presents m an as a simple unity:
acting th rough the influence of the instincts, considere d both as teleo
logical dire cto rs and causal effectors of all activity in man. Dr. Franz
Alexander, director of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, dis closed
th at it was psychoanalysis that brought teleology back to psychology.
As Catholic philosophers, psychologists, and ps ychiatrists , we know that
this psychoanalytic presentation is not enough but it does provide some
sort of framework for the understanding of the b a sic p e rsonality of m an,
the genetic' development of this personality, and its present dyna mic
status. It is true that the schol astic system of philosophy and psychology
has in its possession the true and only wholly satis fying dynamic presen
tation of m an, the u nity in essence, natu re and action, but this dynamic
is only embryonically prese nt in the scholastic syste m, and has never
been worked through nor appeare d in a book, neither in terms of its
basic constituents nor in terms of man's development from the moment
of conception until death. Only when we unde rstand dynamically the
"unity" can we ever hope to understand the inte raction of the v a r ious
elements of this unity. If we have no guiding "unity", we will h ave to
resort to the questionable and time-consuming m ethod suggested by the
authors of analysing habits from a multiple point of view.

With reference to specific topics treated in the text itself, the
that follow might take as their starting point the authors' dis
cussion of the etiology of the neuroses. Perhap s nowhe re else in the text
do the authors approa ch more understandingly the emotional foundation
remarks
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of mental disease than when they, in agreement with all psychiatris s,
state the three pivotal points in the etiology of the neuroses: "1. t ,e
earliest days, weeks, months, and years ( 1-6) of the child's life a ·e
those in which the neuroses have their origin; 2. t�e pathologic ii
psychic habits of children are usually the result of anxious attempts o
defend the ego against the inroads of insecurity and deflation; 3. ad1 :t
neurotic· symptoms take their tone, color, texture, and type from t. e
early neurotic picture developed by the child." However, the autho s
themselves support their theory of the unconscious in the sense f
marginal awareness or .consciousness, as against the Freudian repressi .l
unconscious, and add a fourth item: "Adult neuroses are built on tl �
vague recollection of childhood traumatic experiences." It is extreme;,
difficult to understand how an adult can vaguely recollect the traumat
experiences of the first few weeks of life, because of which the chi! I
established faulty reaction patterns. Moreover, when severely pressec .
the authors push their unconscious so far out to the uttermost margin c:
consciousness that one feels one has jumped over to the represse l
unconscious of Freud. It is particularly disconcerting to us to read aboL ·
the 1·variant Catholic opinions on the unconscious. The only point c ·
agreement seems to be that unconscious acts of knowing are an ope.
contradiction, and with this we would agree. But there are also sue
things as early emotional experiences, directive of basic patterns o ·
perception and behavioral reaction which are quite apropos of the scho
lastic system, and, at the same time, truly unconscious mechanisms; it i·
timely for scholastic psychologists to get together, define an unconsciou,
in the modern sense, and see where it fits into the scholastic system.
In the light of the same three pivotal points it is impossible tc
comprehend the authors' statement that all habits are initially free anc
deliberate, and that the individual at first willingly accepts the wrons_
devices, (i. c. defense mechanisms) of thinking, emoting, and acting. Tc
say, as the authors do, that all habits are formed only through intelligent
repetition is to beg the question. To say that the essential element in
habit formation is not in the mere mechanical repetition of the act but
in the assimilation of a value is true; i. e. we repeat an action because it
has some value to us. But the value can be other than religious, moral,
or intellectual, especially in early childhood; and the value need not be
known intellectually nor is it. Aside from these difficulties, to admit the
authors' statement about habit formation is to uphold the moral theory
of neurosis and psychosis; it would mean that every neurotic and
psychotic individual is responsible and hence to be blamed for his
mental status.
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In the light of the same three pivotal points, it is also difficu�t to
comprehend why the authors state that emotions always contain a
rational element. Both Dom Verner Moore and Rudolph Allers state
that for an emotional experience one need not suppose any higher
activity than the vis cogitativa of St. Thomas-and this is a sensory
ability. Animals have emotions without a rational element; infants and
young children have emotions without the proven presence of the
rational component. It is precisely these very irrational elements that
constitute the particular problem behind the faulty reaction patterns,
that are the particular area of endeavor and labor for the psychiatrist. It
is because of these irrational components, so strongly and deeply rooted
in the mentally-ill neurotic and psychotic, that psychiatrists eschew, in
great part, the intellectual approach in treatment upheld by the authors.
Since the negative emotions have arisen early in a person's life, psycho
therapy will be a long, drawn-out process if it is to achieve a basic
reorientation and reorganization of the individual personality. It is true
that in the case of a normal, mature, harmoniously developed individual,
there is frequently found to be a rational component initiating his
emotional experiences. That is why a normal mature person can be
appealed to intellectually. can be stimulated by rational motives. On the
other hand, common experience with neurotics and psychotics shows
that this will not hold in their case.
The authors have gone into great detail on the subject of defense
mechanisms. Their approach to encouraging the patient to express
feelings of hostility is particularly helpful in the treatment of the rigid,
inhibited, scrupulous Catholic patient who· most frequently becomes
laden with excessive guilt following even the weakest expression of
hostile feelings, especially if the feelings center around those remote
"remnants" of the experiencing man.
The concluding chapter on the relationship between psychiatry,
philosophy, and religion is handled well, but we must ever remember
that the suffering neurotic and psychotic is to be treated much like the
suffering pagan. Our missionaries feed the pagans first, take care of
their illnesses, then tell them of God; so our neurotics and psychotics....:.,
they are in· dire need of kindness, understanding, acceptance, and
patience which come from a human love in the first place, before they
can rise to God their Maker and Greatest Benefactor.
Fundamental Psychiatry
published by
Bruce Publishing Co.
Milwaukee, Wis.
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